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INTRODUCTION
The Congress shall have the Power To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited imes to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.'
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.2
A series of recent cases challenging the constitutionality of congres-
sional expansions of the duration and scope of copyright protection
focused considerable attention on the so-called preamble to the Copy-
right Clause, which requires that congressional action "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."3
In United States v. Moghadam,4 the Eleventh Circuit examined
whether congressional extension of copyright protection to live musical
performances furthers the promotion of progress as required by the
Copyright Clause.5 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,6 the Second
Circuit noted that the "fair use" doctrine, which permits limited unli-
censed copying for academic or journalistic purposes,7 is designed to
better serve the "very purpose" of copyrights laid down in the Copyright
Clause: promoting progress.8 And in Eldred v. Ashcroft,9 the Supreme
Court considered whether, in light of the "preambular statement of pur-
pose" contained in the Copyright Clause, a twenty year extension of
existing copyrights is unconstitutional.' 0
The argument that the preamble of the Copyright Clause provides a
strict constraint on congressional intellectual property legislation has met
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the Anti-Bootlegging Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 2319A).
5. See id. at 1280.
6. 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a challenge to the 1998 Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. on the grounds that it eliminates fair use of
copyrighted materials).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
8. See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 458.
9. 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
10. See id. at 771-72, 777-78 (rejecting a challenge to the 1998 Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827).
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with broad support among legal academics," but it is viewed with some
skepticism by the judiciary. The Supreme Court did acknowledge in
Eldred that intellectual property legislation must, in at least some sense,
promote the progress of science," but stressed that it is for Congress, not
the courts, to decide what does and does not promote progress. 3 The
Court specifically rejected a "stringent" form of rational basis review for
Copyright Clause enactments proposed in Justice Breyer's dissent," not-
ing that the Court will "defer substantially" to congressional findings
that a particular measure will promote progress."
This Article examines the wisdom of the "preambular argument," but
it also addresses a more important question that has likewise been the
subject of a divergence of opinion between academics and the judiciary:
are all the arguments about the Copyright Clause preamble actually
moot? Even in the event that the preamble of the Copyright Clause is
found to sharply limit congressional action under that clause, Congress
might simply enact intellectual property legislation under its commerce
power. Who, after all, could deny that intellectual property rights
implicate interstate commerce? The prevailing view among legal
academics is reflected by William Patry's argument that Congress may
not "ignore the restrictions on its power contained in one clause merely
by legislating under another clause" such as the Commerce Clause. 6 But
the Eleventh Circuit reached just the opposite conclusion in Moghadam,
finding that "as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches beyond
the limits of one grant of legislative power has no bearing on whether it
11. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of the Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, (No. 01-618) cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1062
(2002) ("[i]f an enactment cannot plausibly be said to be directed towards [promoting the
progress of science and useful arts], therefore, it is outside the scope of the [copyright]
power."); Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 535, 540 (2000) ("From a contemporary perspective, the Trade-Mark Cases establish the
important principle that the Intellectual Property Clause constrains congressional power.").
12. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 785.
13. Id. For a discussion of how Eldred has been, and will likely be, received by legal aca-
demics, see Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 50 J. Cop. Soc'Y (forthcoming 2003).
14. Id. at 781 n.10.
15. Id. at781.
16. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Im-
minent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 371 (1999); see also, e.g.,
Benkler, supra note I1, at 538-39; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Con-
stitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REv. 595, 640 (1996);
Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 45, 63-64 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?:
Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual
Property Clause and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999).
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can be sustained under another."'' 7 As such, the Moghadam court held
that "in some circumstances the Commerce Clause indeed may be used
to accomplish that which may not have been permissible under the
Copyright Clause"' 8
In Part I, I examine the text and historical origins of the Copyright
Clause itself, and consider arguments that the "promote progress" re-
quirement is not really a purposive preamble at all. I argue that the
opening text of the clause does constitute a purposive limitation on
congressional action that courts must take seriously, whether we actually
use the term "preamble" or not.
In Part H, I examine the practical import of this limitation in light of
constitutional case law and doctrine. I conclude that although a reading
of the progress requirement as a purposive preamble suggests that courts
ought to be less deferential to congressional assurances of compliance
than would normally be required by limiting language in the Constitu-
tion, any consequent scrutiny would be meaningless if, as the Moghadam
court held, Congress may simply bypass the constraints of the Copyright
Clause by legislating under the Commerce Clause.
In Part III, I consider four different ways to assess whether action
under one constitutional clause impermissibly conflicts with the limita-
tions imposed by a different clause and, if a conflict is found, determine
which should take precedence. I argue that one must consider the rela-
tionship between the constitutional purposes of the respective clauses in
order to successfully analyze such conflicts.
Finally, in Part IV, I use the purposive analysis just described to ex-
amine potential conflicts between the Copyright Clause and intellectual
property legislation passed under the auspices of the Commerce Clause.
I suggest that although there is no necessary conflict between the two,
legislation could nonetheless run afoul of the Copyright Clause preamble
while passing muster under the commerce power.' 9 In those cases, I ar-
gue, judicial weighing of the rival purposive goals involved will be aided
by employing the anti-monopolistic and pro-free expression goals of the
copyright preamble. Thus, courts should not only ensure that Commerce
17. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)).
18. Id. at 1280. The court did assume, arguendo, that the Commerce Clause may not be
so used if the legislation at issue were "fundamentally inconsistent" with the constraints im-
posed by the Copyright Clause, but found no such inconsistency in the legislation before the
court, and therefore upheld the Anti-Bootlegging Act of 1994 as a constitutional exercise of
the commerce power. Id. at 1280 n.12, 1282.
19. For example, legislation giving Disney intellectual property rights in public domain
novels, such as Treasure Island, that have been adapted into successful animated movie fran-
chises may well be permissible under the Commerce Clause, but not the Copyright Clause.
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Clause intellectual property legislation has the purpose of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts, but also should employ exacting
scrutiny when reviewing congressional assertions that this is the case.
I. THE PURPOSIVE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE: Is THE
PREAMBLE REALLY A PREAMBLE?
A. Why Wouldn't We Treat the Promote Progress
Requirement as a Preamble?
Although the Copyright Clause is often described, by both the courts
and legal scholars,' as having a preamble, many commentators are un-
sure if the copyright preamble is a "real" or "full-fledged" preamble of
the type beginning the Second Amendment 2' or the Constitution as a
whole.22 For example, Eugene Volokh writes that "[t]he Second Amend-
ment, unusually for constitutional provisions, contains a statement of
purpose as well as a guarantee of a right to bear arms., 23 He acknowl-
edges, however, that other commentators have also identified the
Copyright Clause as having a similarly purposive structure.24 Sanford
Levinson, also discussing the preamble to the Second Amendment, states
that "no similar clause is part of any other amendment,, 25 but drops an
ambiguous footnote to that claim, offering the Copyright Clause as a
"cf, e.g.'" 26 suggesting that there may even be other similar clauses, aside
from the Copyright Clause. And John Hart Ely offers his own vague
footnote in this context: after noting that the Second Amendment, "as
almost nowhere else" has its "own little preamble,' 2 7 he "but cf"s the
Copyright Clause,2 even though the presence of another example does
not contradict his point.
20. See, e.g., Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 777; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits
on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Con-
gress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1148; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343, 1449 n.461 (1989); Malla Pollack, supra note 16, at 60.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
22. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
23. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793
(1998).
24. Id. at 793 n. 1.
25. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644
(1989).
26. Id. at 644 n.38.
27. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 95
(1980).
28. Id. at 227 n.77.
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There are two reasons why one may hesitate to consider the opening
phrase of the Copyright Clause 29 as a preamble, at least in a full-fledged,
broadly purposive sense analogous to the Preamble of the Constitution
as a whole or the Second Amendment. First, unlike either of these two
preambles, the opening phrase of the Copyright Clause does not indicate
why its purposive requirement is a good thing to achieve. ° In one sense,
of course, we could view all of the Article I, Section 8 powers as impli-
edly good things; why else would Congress be given the power to
establish post offices, 3 for example, unless that was considered desir-
able? And in that sense, the promotion of progress is no less plausibly a
beneficial governmental activity than those made possible in other Sec-
tion 8 clauses. But that sense of desirability does nothing to distinguish
the Copyright Clause from its neighbors, which undermines the main
thrust of these arguments seeking to present the Copyright Clause as
unique within Section 8 by virtue of its opening phrase.
Both the preamble to the Constitution, which states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America,
3 2
and the preamble of the Second Amendment, which states, some-
what more prosaically, "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State "'33 make clear not only what is being done, but
why it is desirable to do so. The Copyright Clause, on the other hand,
does neither. At the very least, then, if the Copyright Clause does have a
preamble, it remains distinct.
Even if, arguendo, we read the preamble as if it were written, "The
promotion of progress being necessary to the well-being of a free State,
Congress shall have the power to grant limited copyrights," there is a
second reason for doubting that the opening clause should be treated as a
purposive preamble. The preambles to the Constitution and the Second
Amendment both refer to a purpose that is broader than, and extrinsic to,
the document or amendment that follows. A purpose, in other words, that
29. "The Congress shall have the Power To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. By contrast, the opening phrase of the Second Amendment, "A well-regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State" does demonstrate why such action is desirable.
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
32. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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may be furthered in several different ways, including, but not limited to,
the one specified. There is no sense in the Preamble to the Constitution
that ordaining and establishing the Constitution was the only thing that
might permissibly be done by the people of the United States in order to
perfect their union, establish justice, and so on. Nor, in the case of the
Second Amendment, is there any reason to believe that Congress may
not take any steps to sustain well-regulated militias other than merely
refraining from abridging the right to bear arms.
In contrast, the Copyright Clause severely limits the means by which
progress may be promoted. It requires that copyrights be secured "for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." 34 It does not simply require that if
Congress should happen to choose copyrights as a method of promoting
progress, then they must be of limited duration; it appears to require that
if Congress intends to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts, then it must do so by, and (in light of the Tenth Amendment) 35 only
by, issuing term limited copyrights. This degree of specificity would be
out of place if promoting progress were meant as a general good that
could be served in many different ways. The Copyright Clause appears
to forbid, for example, offering government subsidies to publishers or
researchers designed to promote scientific development.
3 6
There seems then, at least some reason to hesitate before reading the
Copyright Clause as containing a purposive preamble. But if the "pro-
mote progress" part of the clause is not a preamble, a rather pointed
question suggests itself: what exactly is it?
B. If The Promote Progress Requirement is
Not a Preamble, What is it?
There are three other potential interpretations of the Copyright
Clause that can account for its opening phrase. Those interpretations are:
(1) promoting progress is not a purpose included in the Constitution to
limit congressional use of the power granted by the Copyright Clause,
but is itself the power granted by the clause; (2) the clause actually
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
36. Interestingly, the Copyright Clause also seems to forbid Congress from refusing to of-
fer copyrights in the first place, at least if that refusal is made in the name of progress.
Although Congress could presumably get around this problem by declaring that it has simply
decided not to exercise its option of promoting art and science, it may not wish to make such a
broad declaration. Doing so would implicate all nationally funded science projects, including
those that may not require the Copyright Clause for authorization, for example, NASA or
military related research.
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contains two grants of power to Congress-to promote progress, and to
grant limited term copyrights; and (3) the progress requirement is indeed
a purposive preamble, but in a more modest and restrictive sense than the
broad purposive preambles of the Second Amendment and Constitution
as a whole.37
1. Promoting Progress as a Power, Not a Purpose
Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit, dissenting in Eldred v. Reno, 8 ar-
gued that promoting progress is not a purpose that should inform the use
of the copyright power, but is instead the actual power granted to Con-
gress by the clause. Granting limited term copyrights is simply the
specified means by which that power is to be wielded by Congress. His
dissenting opinion states:
[The Copyright Clause] empowers the Congress to do one thing,
and one thing only. That one thing is "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. How may Congress do that? 'By se-
curing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective rights and discoveries." The clause ... is
a grant of power to promote progress."
This description suggests that the Copyright Clause is less analogous
to the Second Amendment than it is to Article I, Section 8, Clause 12,
which provides that: "The Congress shall have the Power To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years., 40 True, the Copyright Clause is somewhat
more flexible in its specification of the means by which Congress may
wield the granted power, insofar as it merely demands "limited times"
rather than a maximum of two years, but the basic structure is the same.
The clause grants a power, and then limits the means by which that
power may be used.'
37. This view is found to be the most plausible of the three. See infra sections I.B.3 &
I.C.
38. 239 F3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 U.S. 769
(2003).
39. Id. at 381.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
41. The infrequency with which this reading is proposed in litigation may be somewhat
surprising, given that it would support the arguments made in Eldred, Moghadam, and Univer-
sal City Studios that Congress must restrict action under the Copyright Clause to that which
promotes progress, but there are tactical reasons parties seeking to restrain congressional ex-
pansions of copyright protection might balk at such a move. The Copyright Clause, so
understood, would be just one more specific and limited grant of power in Article I, Section 8,
with the same lack of implications for other constitutional provisions as its neighbors. This
would undermine any attempt to argue that the progress limitation of the Copyright Clause
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This reading is facially plausible, but it does nothing to solve the
problem that confronted the expansive purpose reading it is supposed to
replace. Unlike Clause 12, which includes a negative constraint upon
what may be considered necessary and proper methods of raising armies,
the main body of the Copyright Clause is phrased as a positive power to
grant limited time property rights. If the Copyright Clause is intended to
grant Congress the power to promote progress, why specify the one and
only means by which this can be done? In fact, in the context of Article
I, Section 8, it would not only be odd, but a uniquely, and implausibly
egregious example of pre-commitment, akin to adding to Clause 13 the
precise number of times a year that ships must undergo scheduled main-
tenance,42 or to Clause 15 the particular mode of communication by
which the militia is to be called forth.43
Furthermore, it seems strange that the power to promote progress
would be mentioned at all, unless it was intended as a purposive element
in the clause. If the only means by which Congress may promote pro-
gress is by issuing copyrights, then the power granted by the clause is
not to-promote-progress, but rather to-promote-progress-by-issuing-
copyrights, which in practice really just means the power to issue copy-
rights. There would be no reason to specify in the clause why the
Framers though this power important (to promote progress) unless this
purpose was somehow designed to guide Congress in deciding how and
when to issue copyrights. But in that case, the opening phrase of the
clause is less a power in itself, as Judge Sentelle believes, than it is a
purposive guiding principle, or preamble.
should also be applied to overlapping legislation passed under the commerce power. See infra
section IV. Further, the requirement that congressional promotion of progress be effected
through time-limited intellectual property rights would appear, on this reading, to be merely a
secondary aspect of the Copyright Clause-a suggestion, perhaps, of how best to achieve this
end, but by no means a strict requirement that all progress-promotion efforts be restricted to
that particular method. This implication would run counter to efforts to attack the constitution-
ality of copyright extensions such as the Copyright Term Extension Act, see supra note 10, on
the grounds that they constitute an end-run around the limited times requirement. See, e.g.,
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, (No. 01-618), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct.
1062 (2002) ("Congress has now found a clever way to evade this simple constitutional com-
mand. By repeatedly extending the terms of existing copyrights-as it has eleven times in the
past forty years-Congress has adopted a practice that defeats the Framers' plan by creating in
practice an unlimited term.").
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
43. See U.S. CoNrsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. But cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474-75
(1793) (Jay, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the "precise sense and latitude" in which the pream-
bular phrase "to establish justice" is to be understood is provided by the Article lII, Section 1
provision that "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
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2. Two Distinct Powers: To Promote Progress,
and to Grant Copyrights
The Copyright Clause is the only clause in Article I, Section 8 into
which it makes sense to read a distinction between the part of the clause
that grants power and the part that specifies the purpose of that power.
One can inquire as to the purpose of including certain powers in the
Constitution in the first place, such as the power to establish post offices,
but when we examine whether a given law is "necessary and proper"" to
exercise that power it makes no difference whether we ask if a given law
is necessary and proper to establish post offices or to further the purpose
of establishing post offices. Only in the Copyright Clause does there ap-
pear an internal, textual invitation to consider the purpose for which its
power is wielded on each particular occasion.
It is clear that both parts of the Copyright Clause can be understood
as powers, not purposes. On this reading the Clause grants both the
power to issue limited term copyrights and the power to promote pro-
gress. As such, one might argue that the clause should actually be
understood not as comprising a purpose and a power, or a power and a
limitation, but as comprising two distinct powers. Certainly the "neces-
sary and proper" question in each case is quite different: asking whether
a given law serves to promote progress is by no means the same as ask-
ing whether it serves to grant limited term property rights. Considered as
two governmental functions, promoting progress and issuing intellectual
property rights need not necessarily be conjoined into a single power.
Interestingly, the records of the constitutional convention suggest
that the Framers may have understood promoting progress and issuing
property rights to be potentially independent powers. As late as August
18, 1787, the following distinct provisions were under consideration by
the convention: 1) to secure to literary authors their copy rights for a lim-
ited time; 2) to encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries; and 3) to establish
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.45 It
was not until September 10, 1787, that the Committee of Style presented
a version of the Copyright Clause resembling the final, adopted, draft.46
This late development is compatible with the idea that promoting pro-
gress and issuing rights were understood to be distinct powers that could,
in theory, be asserted independently of each other, but which were in fact
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
45. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321-22 (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1986).
46. See id. at 570.
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combined in the final draft of the Constitution so that they would have to
be exercised in unison.
On this "twin powers" reading, judicial review of congressional ac-
tion under the Copyright Clause would involve a two-part test: is the
legislation in question necessary and proper to both (a) promote pro-
gress, and (b) grant a limited term property right to authors and
inventors. If the legislation failed to pass both parts of this test, it would
be unconstitutional, at least as an exercise of the copyright power.' 7 Such
a test would avoid the problems inherent in determining whether Con-
gress acted with the required expansive purpose and would also avoid
the oddness problem faced by Judge Sentelle's "power and limitation"
interpretation. It cannot avoid a different problem of its own, however,
which is that this reading of the clause appears to be hoist on its own
textual petard. It urges us to restrict ourselves to the content of the Con-
stitutional text but ignores the term "by" that conjoins the two halves of
the clause. Judge Sentelle seems to be correct on this score-the plain
meaning of the text is that the clause grants a power and then specifies
the means by which it may be effected. There is no more reason to read
ambiguity into this "by" than there is with respect to the same term in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, which reads in part: "[S]uch District...
as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the Government of the United States. 48 Just as it is
clear that whatever district was to become the seat of government had to
be provided through cession and acceptance, it is also clear that whatever
Congress may do under the Copyright Clause must be done by issuing
limited term property rights to authors and inventors.
3. A Preamble, But With a Limited Purpose
The third way to read the Copyright Clause is probably the most
common: to see the progress requirement as being, after all, a purposive
preamble, but one that is directed solely towards the power specified in
the remainder of the clause-issuing copyrights and patents. On this
view, Judge Sentelle was on the right track, but had it backwards. The
Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to grant limited term intel-
lectual property rights for the purpose of, and only for the purpose of,
promoting science and the useful arts. Unlike a more expansive view of
the preamble's purposive character, this reading does not see the pro-
gress requirement as the raison d'etre of the Copyright Clause, and
certainly not as a license for general government action in its service.
47. The possibility that congressional action could be justified by the commerce power is
considered below. See supra Sections II.c & IV.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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Rather, this reading treats the progress requirement simply as a binding
guide for congressional (or judicial) understanding of the power to grant
term limited copyrights.
This reading can be supported on two different grounds: 1) by the
debate about the proper justification for intellectual property rights sur-
rounding the clause's adoption, and 2) by a contemporary analysis of the
relationship between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
a. Original intent. The framers of the Constitution were confronted
with, broadly speaking, the same two theoretical justifications for intel-
lectual property rights that are still debated today: the natural right of an
individual to own the fruit of her own (intellectual) labor,49 and a more
instrumentalist theory by which limited intellectual property rights pro-
vide an incentive to produce creative and useful works of art and
scholarship for the benefit of all.50
In early eighteenth-century England, the "Statute of Anne" marked a
recognition of the instrumentalist, incentive-minded view of copyrights
by granting statutory intellectual property rights but limiting the mo-
nopolies thereby created to periods ranging from fourteen to twenty-one
years.5' The statute was even subtitled "An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning."52 Even when laid down by statute, however, this utilitarian
vision of intellectual property was not always able to withstand the chal-
lenge of natural rights theories. As Alfred Yen recounts, English courts
initially refused to recognize the Statute of Anne's abridgment of copy-
rights, on the grounds that natural justice required enforcement of
common law rights of occupancy in intellectual property even after the
statutory protection had expired.53
49. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *405
(1765) (analogizing intellectual property to tangible property as a matter of "original and
natural right"); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 517 (1990) (tracing the history of the natural rights view of intellectual
property and advocating a return to that theory in contemporary intellectual property jurispru-
dence).
50. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Locke to Edward Clarke, in PETER KING, THE
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 208-09 (G. Bell, 1884) (arguing for limited property
rights on grounds that issuing "patents for the sole printing of ancient authors is very unrea-
sonable and injurious to learning"), quoted in MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 32-33 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
51. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.), reprinted in HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT
STATUTE AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710 109-17
(Univ. of Tex. Press 1956); see also LYMA RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 143-50 (Vanderbilt Univ. Press 1968) (analyzing the statute's provisions).
52. See RANSOM, supra note 51, at 109.
53. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 527-28 (1990) (recounting the holding in Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep.
201, 218, 220, 252 (1769)). Five years later, this holding was overruled in Donaldson v.
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In America, the utilitarian view was more decisively victorious, most
likely because of the powerful fear of monopolies that underlay much of
the discussion about copyrights. Jefferson, for example, who thought that
the Constitution would have been much improved by a bill of rights pro-
tecting against monopolies,4 conceded that a complete absence of
monopoly rights to intellectual property "lessens the incitements to in-
genuity," but nonetheless wrote that "the benefit of even limited
monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general sup-
pression."55
James Madison, on the other hand, wondered whether, even though
monopolies are "justly classed among the greatest nuisances in govern-
ment,' '56 was it not also true that "as encouragements to literary works
and ingenious discoveries" limited monopolies such as copyrights were
not "too valuable to be wholly renounced? '5 7 The promotion of science
and useful arts was certainly regarded in the early republic as an instru-
mental aspect of the diffusion of knowledge." For example, the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that:
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally
among the body of the people, being necessary for the preserva-
tion of their rights and liberties; ... it shall be the duty of
legislatures and magistrates ... to encourage private societies
and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promo-
tion of agriculture, arts, sciences...29
In this vein, Madison's argument was that the admitted dangers of
monopolies were outweighed by the positive effects of issuing copy-
rights. Intellectual property rights, just as much as public universities,
were necessary to realize the significant public goods resulting from
promoting invention and disseminating ideas.
Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774). See Yen at 527-28. In the United States, Wheaton v. Peters,
62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858) firmly rejected the argument that there existed a common law
right to copyright protection over and above the federal statutory grant thereof. See Yen at
529-30.
54. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (Julian Boyd ed., 1956).
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 443 (Julian Boyd ed., 1956).
56. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in I1 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 300 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
57. Id.
58. See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing The Progress
Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 756-58 (2001) (arguing that the term "progress" was for the
most part used during this era to refer to the dissemination, not improvement, of knowledge).
59. MAss. CONST. of 1780 Ch. 5, § 2.
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By 1813, even Jefferson conceded that he had been won over by the
incentive view. Although he remained steadfast in his belief that ideas
were not property to which anyone had a natural right, he allowed that
"[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as
an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of
the society, without claim or complaint from anybody."6
The evidence suggests, then, that the inclusion of the Copyright
Clause in the Constitution represented a wary, perhaps even grudging
compromise. As late as August 18, 1787, the power to issue copyrights
was on the table in Philadelphia as a potentially free-standing provision
of the Constitution, but ultimately was included only with the addition of
a preamble specifying that the purpose of that power was a widely rec-
ognized component of the general welfare-the promotion of progress.
The preamble was, on this reading, a permanent reminder to Congress
and the people that intellectual property rights were not being recognized
as natural rights akin to those belonging to occupiers of land, but only as
instrumental incentives to the production and dissemination of ideas. The
Supreme Court reiterated this point, stating:
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly
granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit
or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was
another and doubtless primary object in granting and securing
that monopoly.... The true policy and ends of the patent laws
enacted under this Government are disclosed under that article
of the Constitution, the source of all these laws, viz: "to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts .. ,6
This view continues to have currency today. As the Supreme Court
noted in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,62 "The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts. ' 63
b. The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. We do not have
to rely on evidence about the framers' intent, however, to find support for
the "limited purpose preamble" view of the Copyright Clause. As
Rebecca Tushnet has argued, if the Copyright Clause is not interpreted
as being designed to promote progress in the sense of facilitating the free
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1286, 1292 (Merrill Peterson ed., 1984).
61. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858).
62. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
63. Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.8).
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exchange of ideas, it may actually be unconstitutional. 64 Tushnet notes
the tension between the First Amendment requirement that "speech
belongs to no one,"'65 and the Copyright Clause implication that "speech
belongs to someone.' 66 She argues that the supposedly remedial
measures built into copyright law, such as fair use and the
idea/expression distinction not only fail to resolve this tension, but
actually exacerbate it by creating a confusing body of law that is likely
to chill speech through the uncertain prospect of liability for inadvertent
copyright infringement.67 She concludes that the constitutionality of
legislation under the Copyright Clause, in light of the First Amendment,
"depends on the fact that the government interest underlying copyright is
the promotion of speech." '
Tushnet believes that copyright promotes speech by providing pre-
cisely the kind of economic incentive to authors, inventors, and
publishers that was the aim of the Framers.69 One of the key reasons why
providing an economic incentive to write and publish serves the interest
of free speech is that it provides the financial means for the effective dis-
semination of creative output to listeners and readers, who provide a
critical half of the speaker/listener combination that makes possible free-
dom of speech and expression.70 By not providing copyright protection,
then, the government would interfere with the spread of ideas and ex-
pression, resulting in an impoverished marketplace of ideas.7'
Interestingly, Tushnet's description of the role of copyright as part of the
"engine of freedom of expression"72 gels nicely with both Pollack's
claim that "progress" in the context of the Copyright Clause was most
likely intended to mean "dissemination" rather than "improvement,,
73
and the Framers' concern for avoiding a monopoly on information.74
Thus, the limited purpose preamble view of the Copyright Clause
seems plausible both in terms of original intent and a more modem
64. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has
in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunica-
tions Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 35 (2000).
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 6.
67. See id. at 19-27.
68. Id. at 35 (relying upon the holding of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985), which stated, "[t]he Framers intended copyright itself to be an
engine of free expression ... copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dissemi-
nate ideas").
69. See Tushnet, supra note 64, at 36.
70. Id. at 36-37.
71. Id. at 37.
72. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
73. Pollack, supra note 58, at 756-58.
74. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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structural argument. As we will see below,7' however, the difficulty with
this view, as opposed to the problematic "expansive preamble" view, is
that it is not easy to explain why it would apply to intellectual property
legislation enacted under, say, the Commerce Clause.
C. Conclusion
In light of the above historical and contemporary evidence, the
"limited purpose preamble" interpretation seems the most plausible. The
preamble to the Copyright Clause constrains Congress by stipulating that
although copyrights can theoretically be justified in different ways, the
actual Section 8 grant to Congress of the right to issue copyrights is to be
understood only as an instrumental means of promoting the progress of
science and the useful arts.
There is some evidence that the Supreme Court agrees with this view
and understands the preamble to the Copyright Clause to limit congres-
sional authority in this way. The Court stated that "[a]s we have noted in
the past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limita-
tions upon the exercise of that power."76 The Feist Court took this
limitation quite seriously when it found copyright protection for raw
facts unconstitutional, notwithstanding the "sweat of the brow" exerted
in their compilation." The denial of that protection "is neither unfair nor
unfortunate ... [i]t is the means by which copyright advances the pro-
gress of science ... ,7 And, before Eldred, the courts of appeals
generally followed the Supreme Court's lead in this respect.79
Even when the Supreme Court has not described the clause explic-
itly in terms of progress, there has been an underlying theme consistent
with the copyright power's purpose of serving the public good. For ex-
75. See infra section III.
76. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); see also
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) ("We have often recognized the monopoly
privileges that Congress has authorized, while 'intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,' are limited in nature and must
ultimately serve the public good.") (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
77. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[t]he Found-
ing Fathers gave Congress the power to give authors copyrights in order 'to promote the
progress of Science and useful arts ... '") ( quoting U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.8); Mitchell Bros.
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Congress' power
under this Clause is limited to action that promotes the useful arts."); Frantz Mfg. Co. v.
Phenix Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 327 n.48 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The congressional power to grant
monopolies for 'Writings and Discoveries' is likewise limited to that which accomplishes the
stated purpose of promoting 'the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ") (quoting Lee v.
Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971)).
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ample, the Court stated "the ultimate aim [of copyright] is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good."8 ° The only part
of the Copyright Clause that would warrant such a description is the pre-
amble.
Furthermore, it is only by holding Congress to the purpose of the
Copyright Clause, as provided in the preamble, that the Court can justify
its holding that copyright protection may not be extended to something
already in the public domain. As the Court explained in Graham v. John
Deere Co.,8
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose ef-
fects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain,
or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innova-
tion, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must "promote the Progress of... use-
ful Arts.
8 2
Other than the "promote progress," incentive-to-create requirement
in the preamble, there is nothing in the Copyright Clause suggesting that
intellectual property rights may not be issued to works in the public do-
main provided that those rights are of limited duration.
II. To WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PREAMBLE
ACTUALLY CONSTRAIN CONGRESS?
Assuming the preamble of the Copyright Clause does indeed con-
strain the actions of Congress, it is unclear whether those constraints are
extensive. In fact, there are two reasons for believing that they are negli-
gible. First, the degree of deference traditionally given to congressional
determinations of the constitutionally of legislation is so extensive that
80. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
81. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
82. Id. at 6. In their cert. petition, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, attorneys for Eldred make a ver-
sion of this argument, and also suggest that the Court's requirement that copyright only be
extended to original works indicates this type of reliance on the purposive limitations of the
preamble. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, Eldred v. Ashcroft, (No. 01-618) cert.
granted, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002); (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ("The sine qua non of copy-
right is originality")). The argument here is that because the term "writings" in the Copyright
Clause could just as well mean non-original as original writings, the originality requirement
cannot have been derived from the plain language of the clause but must derive from the pre-
ambulatory purpose of promoting progress. See Petition for Cert. at 13. This argument seems
considerably weaker, though, than that concerning the prohibition on removing works from
the public domain, because even if the term "writings" is ambiguous, the phrase "their writ-
ings" is less so, and the term "inventions" is not at all. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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requiring Congress to adhere to the "promote progress" condition would
in effect merely require Congress to accompany any extension of copy-
right with a statement that doing so will promote progress. Second,
although there are some grounds for believing that the preambulatory
character of the Copyright Clause's limitation might make courts less
deferential to Congress when evaluating congressional action under that
particular clause, it is not clear that the preamble of the Copyright
Clause can be understood to constrain congressional action under the
authority of other constitutional provisions, such as the Commerce
Clause.
A. Judicial Treatment of Limiting Language in General
Several constitutional provisions contain limiting language of some
form, either purposive, such as the requirement that compensated takings
of private property be for public use,83 or technical, such as the necessity
that bankruptcy laws be uniform.'
When the constitutional text is unambiguous, these constraints are rig-
idly applied. For example, Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 permits
Congress to "raise and support armies, 8 ' but specifies that "no Appropria-
tion of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years., 86 As
the Court noted in the Legal Tender Cases,87 "[aippropriations to execute
those powers may be made by Congress, but no appropriations of money
to that use can be made for a longer term than two years, as an appro-
priation for a longer term is expressly prohibited by the same clause
which confers the power to raise and support armies."8
The Supreme Court has even expanded the scope of a constitutional
constraint beyond the apparent textual requirements of the provision in
question. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State ... "9 This restriction, read literally, not only
appears to apply exclusively to the Article III jurisdiction of federal
courts, but arguably applies even then only to suits premised on diversity
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
86. Id.
87. 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
88. Id. at 613-14.
89. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (2002) ("the sover-
eign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment").
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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jurisdiction.9' The Supreme Court, however, has found that Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity also protects states in federal question
92suits involving Congress's Article I powers, suits in admiralty (as op-
posed to law or equity), 93 administrative agency tribunals, 9 and state
courts. 9 In these cases, the Court looked beyond the text of the Eleventh
Amendment to the division of authority between federal and state gov-
ernments contemplated by that amendment, 96 and even to the
fundamental character of state sovereignty, as evidenced by "the Consti-
tution's structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by
this Court. 97
Other constitutional limitations on congressional power are more
ambiguous. In such cases, the Supreme Court continues to pay lip ser-
vice to Constitutional limitations on congressional authority. But, the
Court defers so extensively to congressional determinations of whether
constitutional constraints have been adhered to that those constraints are
rendered practically meaningless. Four illustrative examples follow:
1. Taxation and the general welfare. The congressional power to tax,
granted by Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, was limited by the original
Constitution in two ways: a) taxes must be assessed to "pay the Debts
and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States,"98 and b) they must be "apportioned among the several states ...
according to their respective Numbers." 99 The Sixteenth Amendment re-
moved the apportionment requirement, but the general welfare
requirement remains a strict limitation on congressional authority under
Clause 1 today.' °° When assessing whether Congress is actually exercis-
ing its power to tax and spend in the name of the public purposes listed,
91. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Jus-
tice Brennan has persuasively explained that the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional
restriction is best understood to apply only to suits premised on diversity jurisdiction").
92. Id. at 72-73 (Congress may not use its Article I powers to "circumvent the constitu-
tional limitations placed [by the Eleventh Amendment] upon federal jurisdiction.").
93. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1921) ("It is true the Amendment speaks
only of suits in law or equity ... it seems to us equally clear that it cannot with propriety be
construed to leave open a suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals,
whether its own citizens or not.").
94. South Carolina Ports Authority, 122 S. Ct. at 1875.
95. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
96. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system ... it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an indi-
vidual without its consent") (internal citation omitted).
97. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
98. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (requiring uniformity through
the United States of duties, imposts, and excises).
100. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); see also Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
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however, "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Con-
gress.'"
0
2. Uniform bankruptcy laws. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 empowers
Congress to "establish ... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States.'"'0° In Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n v.
Gibbons,0 3 the Supreme Court found the labor protection provisions of
the Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance Act unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that "the uniformity requirement of the Clause
prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply
to the affairs of only one named debtor. ' '° The Railway Labor Execu-
tives court noted, though, that the Supreme Court had never previously
invalidated a bankruptcy law for lack of uniformity, 5 and stated that
"[t]he uniformity requirement is not a straitjacket that forbids Congress
to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress
from recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial transactions in
a uniform manner."' 6 In addition, the uniformity requirement does not
prevent laws that have different results in different states, '°7 direct meas-
ures specifically at geographically isolated problems,0 8 or even "treat
'railroad bankruptcies as a distinctive and special problem.' " 09
3. Needful buildings. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 authorizes Con-
gress to "exercise [exclusive] Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other need-
ful Buildings."" ° Although continuing judicial mention and explanation
of this list of purposes suggests that Congress may not entirely ignore it,
in practice the requirement that Congress exercise "exclusive jurisdic-
tion""' has been read loosely, permitting Congress to invoke Clause 17
"without taking exclusive jurisdiction" when it so desires."' Further-
more, the list of permissible purposes of that power has been "broadly
construed, and the acquisition by consent or cession of exclusive or par-
101. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
103. 455 U.S. 457 (1981).
104. Id. at471.




109. Id. (quoting Reg'l R.R. Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974)).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
Ill. Id.
112. See Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1938) ("[The Supreme
Court] has given full consideration to the constitutional power of the United States to acquire
land under Clause 17 without taking exclusive jurisdiction.").
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tial jurisdiction over properties for any legitimate governmental purpose
beyond those itemized is permissible."
'" 3
4. Takings. The Fifth Amendment states, "[N]or shall public property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 4 Not only is the
procedural requirement of compensation considered binding,"5 so too is
the purposive requirement that even compensated takings must be for
public use. The Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated that 'one person's
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person with-
out a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid.' ,,,6
For example, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,"7 the Court
invalidated a compensated taking of property that did not have a justify-
ing public purpose.18
Missouri Pacific was extremely unusual, however, because the taking
in question "was not claimed to be" for a public purpose." 9 When Con-
gress does claim a public use, courts will not substitute their judgment
for that of the legislature as to what constitutes a public purpose "unless
the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."'20 The effect of this
holding is that the public use requirement is coterminous with congres-
sional police powers.' 2' The Supreme Court has never struck down a
compensated taking where Congress claims the exercise of eminent do-
main is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."
2
These four examples offer no indication that the deference due to
Congress in determining whether any given measure advances the pro-
gress of the useful arts and sciences should be any less extensive than
when determining whether a taking is for public use. In fact, to the ex-
tent that promoting progress is an inherently speculative and
experimental project, one might argue that Congress would be entitled to
more deference towards its efforts in that field. As the Supreme Court
113. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.1 1 (1976).
114. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
115. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) ("The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment... prohibits the government from taking private property for
public use without just compensation.... Our cases establish that even a minimal 'permanent
physical occupation of real property' requires compensation under the Clause.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
116. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Con-
sol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
117. 164 U.S. 403.
118. Id. at416-17.
119. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
120. Hawaii Housing, 467 U.S at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R.
Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
121. Id. at 240.
122. Id. at 241.
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remarked in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,123 "courts must
accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.
'
2
The Fifth Circuit applied considerable deference with respect to the
Copyright Clause when it noted that "[i]t is by the lenient standard of
McCulloch that we must judge whether Congress has exceeded its con-
stitutional powers in enacting an all-inclusive copyright statute.' 2' The
Mitchell court found that although Congress could reasonably conclude
progress would be served by requiring that every copyrighted work be
individually shown to advance the progress of the useful arts, it could
equally well "reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativ-
ity is not to impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter
of copyrightable works."'' 26 The D.C. Circuit suggested that the possibil-
ity that motion pictures might be more likely preserved in digital form if
their owners were given an incentive to convert them would in itself be
enough to justify even a retroactive copyright extension in the name of
promoting progress. 2 And, as noted above, the Supreme Court stated in
Eldred that the Court will "defer substantially" to congressional findings
that a particular measure will promote progress.128
B. Judicial Treatment of Preambles in Particular
Does it make a difference, one might ask, that the Copyright
Clause's limitation is in a preamble? The D.C. Circuit decided that it
does not; it held that the preamble of the Copyright Clause does not in
any way constrain Congress. 29 But there are reasons to believe that it
should, given judicial treatment of the other two preambles in the Consti-
tution: the overall Preamble, and the preamble of the Second
Amendment.
123. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
124. Id. at 665.
125. Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979).
126. Id.
127. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 E3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also S. Rep. No. 104-
315, at 12 (1996). This apparently off-hand remark by the court may actually be more signifi-
cant than it appears on the surface, insofar as it tends to depart from the established principle
that copyright may not be extended to a work in the public domain. See supra notes 81-82,
and accompanying text. Relying on the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit Court, it is not at all
clear why removing at least some works from the public domain could not promote progress,
given that the preservation rationale for retroactively extending existing copyrights would be
equally applicable to movies whose copyright has expired, but of which there remain only a
few extant copies, all owned by a movie studio. If extending the life of a movie in order to
provide an incentive to convert it to digital format would promote progress, then so too would
temporarily removing a movie from the public domain for the same purpose.
128. See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 781.
129. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 379.
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1. The Preamble to the Constitution. The Preamble to the Constitu-
tion is not generally considered to be a source of authority for the
government, or even a guiding principle for the exercise of specific con-
stitutional powers; instead, it is considered merely a statement of the
general purpose and intent with which the Constitution was adopted in
the first place. 30 This treatment is consistent with judicial treatment of
other types of preambles: the Court has looked to the preamble of a state
constitutional amendment, 3' and to the preambles of federal statutes,'32
in order to discern their respective purposes.
For the most part, inquiries by the Supreme Court into the purpose
of the Constitution, as expressed by the Preamble, are found in dissent-
ing opinions. 3 1 On at least two occasions, however, the Court has looked
to the Constitutional Preamble to limit the powers of government. In
Kansas v. Colorado,'34 the Court rejected an argument that the Tenth
Amendment reserves all non-enumerated federal powers to the states.
130. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) ("Although that Pre-
amble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the
Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on
the Government of the United States or on any of its Departments"); JOHN R. VILE, A
COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 24 (1993) ("[The
Preamble] is rarely cited in judicial opinions because it grants no specific powers to the na-
tional government or to any other."). But see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 60
(1995) ("Many, including the Supreme Court, fail to appreciate that the preamble has substan-
tive significance."); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 52
(1999) (proposing a view of the constitution that regards its binding and motivating elements
as consisting solely in the call to promote the general welfare in the Preamble, with the re-
maining constitutional text being no more than a series of default suggestions about how best
to realize that goal in practice); Remarks of Harry A. Blackmun: Law Dedication Dinner, in
IOWA ADVOC., Fall/Winter 1986-1987, at 15 ("Must we not say that the law, in order to be
true, at least must 'establish Justice,' within the meaning of the ringing words of the Preamble
to the Constitution of the United States?") (quoted in Paul R. Baier, Dedication: Mr Justice
Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau, 59 LA. L. REv. 647, 654 (1999).
131. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829-30 (1995).
132. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (finding
that congressional use of the terms "including" and "such as" in the preamble to the Copyright
Act of 1976 showed that the examples of fair use listed in the Act were intended to be "illus-
trative and not limitative.") (citation omitted).
133. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The notion that the Constitution of the United States, designed, among other things, 'to
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, ... and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity,' prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of
eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 246 n.17 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is commonly overlooked that justice is one
of the goals of our people as expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution.. "); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 72 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (defending a New York eavesdrop-
ping statute on the grounds that it was "well adapted to our Government, set up, as it was, to
'insure domestic tranquility' under a system of laws.").
134. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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The Court held that, in light of the preamble, it was clear that the Tenth
Amendment reserved power to the people of all the states, not to the
states themselves (qua governmental units).' 3' Thus, if a distinct constitu-
tional provision prevents a given power from actually falling to the states
then it must by definition belong to Congress. 36 In U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, 37 the Court struck down an Arkansas constitutional amend-
ment designed to impose term limits on congresspersons elected from
that state, and noted that "[iun the absence of a properly passed constitu-
tional amendment, allowing individual States to craft their own
qualifications for Congress would thus erode the structure envisioned by
the Framers, a structure that was designed, in the words of the Preamble
to our Constitution, to form a 'more perfect Union.' ,,138
Furthermore, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 39 a case
concerning a Missouri statute whose preamble contained "findings" by
the state legislature that "[t]he life of each human being begins at con-
ception,'"' the Court acknowledged that this preamble might be used by
state courts to interpret other statutes or regulations, or even other parts
of the same statute, in which case the statute may be unconstitutional. 
4
The Court held that, absent evidence of such use, the preamble did not
fall afoul of Roe v. Wade'42 because it did not itself regulate abortion.'
43
Instead, it deferred to state courts, allowing them to answer the question
whether the preamble might in fact be used impermissibly in practice-
clearly acknowledging the possibility that a preamble could be consid-
ered binding by a court on its interpretation of the statutory language
following the preamble, or even language in other statutes. '"
2. The preamble to the Second Amendment. As Roland Beason has
pointed out, the Second Amendment as a whole, let alone its preamble,
has been almost studiously ignored by the Supreme Court.' 45 Even recent
opinions discussing firearms have managed to avoid reviewing any of the
over twenty thousand current state and local gun control laws.'46 That
this preamble does have some constitutional significance is suggested by
135. Id. at 90.
136. Id.
137. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
138. Id. at 838.
139. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
140. Id. at 501.
141. Id. at 506.
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
144. See id.
145. Roland H. Beason, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It Is lime to Protect the
Right of the Individual to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 ALA. L. REv. 561,579-80 (1999).
146. Id.
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United States v. Miller,'47 one of the few Supreme Court cases in which
the meaning of the Second Amendment has been at issue. Miller rejected
a Second Amendment challenge to a Commerce Clause statute because
the plaintiff failed to show that his particular weapon was suitable for
military use.'48 Had his weapon been service issue, or similar, the Court's
opinion suggests, Miller's suit might have prevailed. In the more than
sixty years since Miller, the Court has never questioned the validity of
that decision, and has never held either that a well regulated militia is no
longer necessary for the security of a free state, or that this necessity is
irrelevant for all practical purposes to modem-day federal firearms regu-
lation. It does not seem entirely unreasonable to suggest that one reason
for the unwillingness of the Court to openly allow the Second Amend-
ment preamble to fall by the wayside is that it is just that: a preamble,
which is not so easily buried as a constraint that is already half hidden as
a mere qualification within a clause.
Judicial treatment of the preambles to the Constitution as a whole
and to the Second Amendment suggest that preambulatory purposive
statements may, at the very least, be due more respect by the Court than
other less prominent limitations on constitutionally granted powers. It is
easier for courts to interpret "other needful Buildings" expansively when
it is but one of a list of governmental functions that involve federally
purchased property than if Clause 17 began "To construct needful build-
ings, by means of exercising exclusive jurisdiction over federally
purchased land." When the purpose for a constitutional power is bla-
tantly stated, rather than merely implied (by a list of similar activities,
for example), there may be reason for less deference in evaluating
whether Congress has conformed to the constraint.
If I am correct in suggesting that the Copyright Clause not only indi-
cates the purpose for which Congress is granted the power to dispense
intellectual property rights, but in doing so excludes other potential pur-
poses that could have been read into that clause sans preamble, then
there is reason to believe that courts ought to be less deferential to Con-
gress with respect to the Copyright Clause than in other contexts. Even if
the Turner Court's assurance of substantial deference towards predictive
judgments means that the Court's hands are tied when second-guessing
congressional assurances that progress will be promoted by a particular
extension of intellectual property rights,49 the Court can still insist that
147. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
148. Id. at 178 ("In the absence of any evidence [that the right to own a sawn-off shot-
gun] has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the fight to keep and bear such
an instrument.").
149. See supra note 123.
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the progress promised be of the specific variety envisioned by the Copy-
right Clause, and not simply some generic assurance of improvement.
Determining whether there will be progress is predictive, and therefore
worthy of deference. Determining what will progress if those predictions
actually come true is not predictive, and therefore requires less defer-
ence.
Even if the Copyright Clause deserves heightened scrutiny, such
scrutiny may have little practical import. As the legal landscape currently
lies, there is good reason for Congress to believe it can side-step any
limitations imposed by the Copyright Clause preamble simply by enact-
ing intellectual property legislation under the authority of the Commerce
Clause.
C. Bypassing the Constraints of the Copyright
Clause With the Commerce Power
Where the Court has addressed the limiting power of the preamble
and the underlying purpose of the Copyright Clause, it did not extend
that power beyond the Copyright Clause. In the Trade-mark Cases, for
example, the Court separately examined the constitutional authority for
trademark legislation under the Copyright Clause and the Commerce
Clause."0 Only after determining that Congress had claimed authority for
its action under the Copyright Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause,
did the Court examine the boundaries of the Copyright Clause.' In a
later case, the Supreme Court held that the preamble to the Copyright
Clause "is both a grant of power and a limitation,'"'52 but did not extend
this limitation to congressional action authorized by other clauses:
"Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the re-
straints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.' ' 53 And although
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, two lower court
decisions suggest that there is no absolute barrier between the Copyright
Clause and the commerce power. 14
150. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879) (holding that Congress may not protect
trademarks under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 because they lack originality).
151. Id.
152. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). The limitation is that Congress
may not create intellectual property rights "whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available," but only grant
exclusive rights when doing so will promote "[i]nnovation, advancement, and... add[s] to the
sum of useful knowledge.. "Id. at 6.
153. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
154. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11 th Cir. 1999); Frederick Warne
& Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 5 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York considered a potential conflict be-
tween copyright protection, awarded under the authority of the
Copyright Clause, and trademark protection, awarded by the Lanham
Act under the auspices of the commerce power.'5 6 The Warne court held
that there is no necessary overlap between trademark protection and
copyright protection for two reasons. First, because trademarks are not
considered original writings,' 7 they are therefore ineligible for copyright
protection. Indeed, the Trade-mark Cases originally found federal
trademark protection unconstitutional as a purported exercise of the
Copyright Clause, precisely because trademarks do not fall within the
ambit of the that clause.'58 Second, Lanham Act protection against unau-
thorized copying or use is more limited than that of copyright law,
extending only to uses of a protected mark that might confuse customers
about the manufacturer or endorser of the goods so labeled.'5 9
In practice, however, there is some potential overlap between trade-
marks and copyrightable works. Some marks may be original enough to
qualify independently for copyright protection; and if a once-
copyrighted image became sufficiently associated with a product, it
would then be eligible for trademark protection.
The Frederick Warne court held that there is no conflict between
trademark protection, which is assigned in perpetuity and without regard
to originality, and copyright protection, which may only be granted for
limited times and to original works."6 The court even went so far as to
state that "[d]ual protection under copyright and trademark laws is
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters [which
may be] deserving copyright protection, [but] also serve to identify the
creator, thus meriting protection under theories of trademark or unfair
competition.' ', 6' Notably, the Warne court held this way in spite of the
fact that the Copyright Clause appears to specify in its preamble that the
only acceptable reason for congressional issuance of intellectual property
rights is the progress of science and the useful arts, not consumer
155. 481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
156. Id. at 1196-97; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (1988).
157. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 ("we are unable to see any such power in the
constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and discover-
ies.").
158. See id.
159. See Frederick Warne, 481 E Supp. at 1195; 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
160. See id. at 1196 ("The fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the
public domain should not preclude protection under the trademark laws so long as it is shown
to have acquired independent trademark significance, identifying in some way the source or
sponsorship of the goods.").
161. Id. at 1196-97 (citations omitted).
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protection. One might argue that facilitating consumer confidence in
interstate purchases indirectly increases book sales and therefore
enhances authors' incentives to write, but that would not solve the
problem posed by the fact that trademarks may be renewed indefinitely,
and therefore are not necessarily limited in duration.
62
A stronger argument that there is no absolute barrier between the
copyright clause and the commerce power is provided by the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Moghadam. 63 That Court held that there are some
circumstances in which Congress may permissibly enact legislation un-
der the commerce power that it would not be authorized to enact under
the Copyright Clause.' 64
If these cases indicate the existence of a legitimate device by which
Congress may side-step the constraints of the Copyright Clause pream-
ble simply by claiming authority for copyright legislation under the
Commerce Clause, then the constraints of the copyright clause will be
nothing more than a chimera. Whether that device is in fact indicated is
addressed in the following Sections.
III. UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLAUSES
Many provisions of the Constitution have little or no impact on other
provisions. The Article II power of the President to make recess ap-
pointments, 65 for example, has no bearing on the Third Amendment's
conditions on quartering soldiers in private homes. 66 Even clauses that
contain limitations on the exercise of their own power usually do not
implicate congressional action under other clauses; the two-year limit on
military appropriations, for instance, 67 does not limit congressional tax-
ing and spending on education under the General Welfare Clause. 161
But there are parts of the Constitution that do conflict with other
provisions. The most direct example of conflict is an amendment repeal-
ing all or part of a previously existing constitutional provision, such as
162. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (2000). Of course, a cynic may suggest that, in light
of Eldred, copyrights can also now be renewed indefinitely at the whim of Congress, much
like trademarks.
163. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
164. Id. at 1280; See also supra notes 17-20, and accompanying text.
165. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3.
166. See U.S. CONsT. amend. III.
167. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
168. See U.S. CON T. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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the Sixteenth and Twenty-first Amendments.' 69 Less explicit, but equally
clear, conflicts exist between positive grants of power, such as the Com-
merce Clause, and negative restrictions on the scope of governmental
activity, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,70 or the First 7' and Tenth
Amendments. 7 1 In cases involving these indirect conflicts it is not clear,
a priori, which ought to be reined in in the name of the other. As a result,
the courts must decide which provision takes precedence. Although the
Supreme Court has not always been consistent, or even clear, about the
rationale for giving one clause precedence over another, it has generally
been willing to undertake this task and to constrain congressional power
under one clause in the name of restrictions imposed elsewhere in the
Constitution.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 17 the Court invoked
the separation of powers doctrine to find that the Bill of Attainder Clause
acts as a broad constraint on congressional exercise of Article I pow-
ers. 74 The Court likened this constraint to those imposed on the judiciary
by Article III's "cases or controversies" requirement. 1 And in New York
v. United States,176 the Court looked to the general philosophy of federal-
ism, supposedly embodied by the Tenth Amendment, to explain how
congressional power is constrained by that amendment. 177 The New York
Court also stated that the First Amendment constrains congressional ex-
'71
ercise of Article I powers, although it did not specify why this is so.
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (removing the Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 appor-
tionment requirement from the Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 taxation power); Id. amend. XXI
(repealing the eighteenth amendment).
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
173. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
174. Id. at 469-71.
175. See id. at 469.
176. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
177. See id. at 156-57 ("The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Con-
gress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself .... Instead, the
Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.").
Predictably, this appeal to the political philosophy expressed by the Constitution is some-
what controversial. See, e.g., id. at 207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) ("One would not know from
reading the majority's account, for instance, that the nature of federal-state relations changed
fundamentally after the Civil War ... While I believe we should not be blind to history, nei-
ther should we read [the Tenth Amendment] so selectively as to restrict the proper scope of
Congress' powers under Article I, especially when the history not mentioned by the majority
fully supports a more expansive understanding of the legislature's authority than may have
existed in the late 18th century.").
178. See id. at 156 ("[U]nder the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers
engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by
the First Amendment.").
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Commentators suggest that the First Amendment may take precedence
on textual grounds, because the words "Congress shall make no law" are
an "obvious and express effort" to restrain legislative action.'79 Alterna-
tively, it may just be because the First Amendment was ratified after the
original Constitution, and so may be considered to modify those earlier
provisions with which it comes into conflict.'80
Conflicts between the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause
are not only less explicit within the Constitution than the above exam-
ples, but are also less clearly conflicts at all, as neither clause is phrased
as a general limitation on congressional power. An argument that the
preamble of the Copyright Clause limits congressional power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause must therefore be able to explain not only
why the Copyright Clause takes precedence, but also how the two
clauses come into conflict in the first place. In this Section I will con-
sider four arguments to that effect, and assess their success in satisfying
those two requirements. They are:
the clauses conflict whenever Congress legislates in the
name of one power in order to evade the limitations of a
more appropriate power;
" the clauses conflict when one encroaches on the other to an
extent that it is rendered superfluous, because the Constitu-
tion may not be interpreted so as to render part of itself
superfluous;
" if Congress uses one clause to side-step the restrictions im-
posed by another clause, an impermissible logical
inconsistency is created within the structure of the Constitu-
tion; and
" an impermissible conflict is created whenever Congress acts
under any constitutional provision in a manner that frustrates
an explicit constitutional purpose set out in a different provi-
sion.
I will argue that the first of these proposals, the evasion argument, is
generally plausible but ineffective with respect to the Commerce Clause.
Due to the nature of modem commerce, the commerce power is
179. See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 566 n.6 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
180. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2146 n.386 (1996) ("It must not be forgotten that the First Amend-
went was enacted and ratified subsequent to the original text of the Constitution.
Consequently ... to the extent the original text is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause,
the original text, not the Establishment Clause, must yield.").
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considered the appropriate authority for an increasingly expansive range
of legislation. I will argue that the second, encroachment argument
would be applicable to the commerce power, but that evidence of its
actual adoption as an interpretive canon is too ambiguous to warrant
judicial application to a conflict between the Copyright and Commerce
Clauses; and I will argue that while the third, the logical consistency
argument, does succeed in overcoming the problems characteristic of the
first two arguments, it fails to provide any mechanism for resolving
actual conflicts in a non-circular manner. Finally, I will argue that the
fourth, purposive argument provides reason to believe that Congress may
not constitutionally legislate under any of its powers in a manner
inconsistent with the preamble of the Copyright Clause.
A. Evasion
The Supreme Court has made clear that a state cannot evade the re-
quirements of the federal Constitution simply by claiming to adhere to
those requirements while acting a manner intended to accomplish indi-
rectly what may not be done directly.81 Although directed at the state of
Arkansas, the admonition that "constitutional rights would be of little
value if they could be ... indirectly denied"' 8 2 is phrased and justified
quite generally, allowing for equal applicability to the federal govern-
ment. "To argue otherwise is to suggest that the Framers spent
significant time and energy in debating and drafting Clauses that could
easily be evaded."' 83 There is no reason to think that Congress would be
exempt from this principle; an entitlement to judicial deference is one
thing, but a license to evade the Constitution is quite another. One could
argue that this non-evasion principle means that if a particular congres-
sional measure would appropriately fall within the ambit of one
constitutional grant of power, it is impermissible for Congress to evade
the limitations imposed on that power by artfully claiming to legislate
under a different, less suitable power.
Certainly, members of the public may not practice this type of eva-
sion. In Albright v Oliver,'8" the Supreme Court rejected an argument that
it deemed an attempt to evade the limitations of Fourth Amendment
rights of criminal suspects by asking the Court to recognize a "substan-
tive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
181. U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829-31 (1995).
182. Id. at 829 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)).
183. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 831.
184. 510 U.S. 266 (1994). This example comes from William Patry, supra note 16, at
376 n.94.
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be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause."' 85 Not-
withstanding the fact that, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments have been historically viewed as overlapping,
86
and that "we have never previously thought that the area of overlapping
protection should constrain the independent protection provided by ei-
ther," 87 the Court insisted that "it is the Fourth Amendment, and not
substantive due process, under which [the] claim must be brought."' 8
The closest the Supreme Court came to constraining congressional
power by extending limitations contained in one clause to preclude ac-
tion otherwise authorized under another, was in Railway Labor
Executives', where the Court asserted in dicta that Congress may not
enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws under its Commerce Clause pow-
ers."' Doing so, it reasoned, would "eradicate from the Constitution a
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws*"'' This
would "allow Congress to repeal the uniformity requirement from Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution."'' Oddly, not only was this remark dicta,
but it was sua sponte dicta, as the Court prefaced its remarks by
acknowledging that "we do not understand either appellant or the United
States to argue that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its
power under the Commerce Clause.', 92 The precedential value of this
remark is somewhat ambiguous. One could argue that sua sponte dicta is
even less binding than ordinary dicta; conversely, one could suggest that
the Court, in light of its present judgment, recognized a possible future
argument and wanted to make clear in advance that it would not wash.
The courts of appeals have adopted the former interpretation. The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Railway Labor Executives in
Moghadam,93  but distinguished between the fundamental
incompatibility of uniform and non-uniform bankruptcy laws recognized
in Railway Labor Executives, and the mere difference in degree between
the copyright protection offered by the Anti-Bootlegging statute and that
permitted under the Copyright Clause. 94 Further, in Authors League of
America, Inc. v. Oman, 95 the Second Circuit did not even mention
185. 510 U.S. at 268.
186. Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at271.
189. 455 U.S. 457, 468-69 (1981).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 473.
192. Id. at 468.
193. 175 F.3d at 1281.
194. See id.
195. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).
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Railway Labor Executives in the course of finding that Congress may
permissibly deny copyright protection to certain classes of imported
works under the commerce power.'96 Responding to the argument that
copyright legislation must promote the progress of science and the useful
arts, not just the profitability of the printing industry, the court turned to
the commerce power as an alternative justification for the measure,
stating "the copyright clause is not the only constitutional source of
congressional power that could justify the manufacturing clause. In our
view, denial of copyright protection to certain foreign-manufactured
works is clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature's power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations.' '97
Unlike the bright, if periodically flexible,'98 line between uniform
and non-uniform bankruptcy laws, the relationship between the scope
and duration of copyrights and interstate commerce is arguably fluid, to
the extent that a changing, increasingly information-driven economy
may result in copyright extensions implicating commerce in a way that
they simply did not previously. As made clear in Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 99 for example, the Court is open to the possibility that
the scope of interstate commerce has simply changed over time, and that
legislation that would once have exceeded the commerce power no
longer does.20 In light of the ample power granted by the Commerce
Clause, the Heart of Atlanta Court saw no need to investigate whether
the Fourteenth Amendment would provide independent (and perhaps
more limited) authority for the legislation challenged in that case.20 ' It
seems the Court was untroubled by the possibility of overlapping, inde-
pendent sources of congressional power with respect to civil rights
legislation. There is no apparent reason why the Supreme Court would
be any more troubled in the context of intellectual property, whose role
in interstate commerce has arguably changed as much over the last
twenty years as did the mobility of the American populace and circula-
tion of facilities, goods, and services between 1883 and 1964.202
In sum, even if we accept that Congress may not evade constraints
imposed by the clause most appropriate to its action by using a less ap-
196. See id. at 221.
197. Id. at 224.
198. See supra notes 103-109, and accompanying text.
199. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
200. See id. at 251 (noting that civil rights legislation that may have been impermissible
under the Commerce Clause in the past may be permissible under the same clause later, given
the changing face of interstate commerce).
201. See id. at 249-50.
202. See id. at 251-52 (distinguishing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), on the
grounds that the nature of interstate commerce has changed markedly in the intervening years
since those cases).
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propriate clause instead, it may also be true that notwithstanding the ex-
plicit textual connection between the Copyright Clause and intellectual
property rights, the commerce clause may increasingly be considered the
more appropriate constitutional power for regulating copyrights in the
global information age.23 The evasion argument does not establish a con-
flict between the clauses which suggests that congressional action should
be declared unconstitutional solely on that basis.
B. Encroachment
Even if, as the Supreme Court's approach to the commerce power
suggests, different clauses of the Constitution can overlap without con-
flict, and an action that would not be allowed under one applicable
clause is permissible under another, one might argue that this overlap
should not be tolerated where it effectively renders the more limited
clause entirely superfluous. After all, as Marbury v. Madison makes
clear, "[a]ffirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other
objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive
sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all. It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without
effect. '" 2 4 Further, as Justice Thomas complained in his concurrence to
United States v. Lopez, °5 if the Commerce Clause gave Congress the au-
thority to "regulate all matters that substantially affect commerce," it
would "not need the separate authority to ... grant patents and copy-
rights.. *,206
The Supreme Court has often held that a constitutional provision
may not be interpreted to render that same clause redundant or useless.
For example, in Marbury the Court held that Article III may not be con-
strued to allow Congress to allocate the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in ways that contradict the positive
grants of such authority to the Court.20 7 This principle was echoed in
203. For example, one of the justifications for the Copyright Term Extension Act men-
tioned by the Eldred Court was that it would bring U.S. copyright law in line with that of the
European Union. See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 781-82.
204. 5 U.S. 137, 174; cf Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001)
("Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render super-
fluous other provisions in the same enactment.") (quoting Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990)); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 91 (1907) ("It would
be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed and
that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed.").
205. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
206. Id. at 588.
207. 5 U.S. at 174.
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Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,208 which also concerned interpretations of Ar-
ticle III that would defeat the purpose of that same Article. Here, the
Court noted that Congress may not "under the sanction of the constitu-
tion . . . defeat the constitution itself.
'2 9 Also, in United States v. Miller
210
the Court held that the National Firearms Act of 1934 was constitutional
because it prohibited only weapons without a military pedigree, and
hence unnecessary for the common defense provided by a militia. 211 This
reasoning could be interpreted to mean that the Second Amendment right
to bear arms may not be construed in a way that renders moot the pre-
amble to the same amendment.
In both Martin and Miller, the Court was concerned with the internal
dynamics of constitutional clauses, and appeared reluctant to allow one
part of a clause to obviate another part. It is not clear that the Court
would be willing to extend this non-superfluousness principle to situa-
tions involving the effects of one clause upon a different clause. Not only
was Justice Thomas unable to attract any other votes for his recommen-
dation that the Court rein in the Commerce Clause in the name of
potentially superceded Article I powers, but, as Michael Doff has argued,
the history of the Constitution since ratification shows that there is "in
fact no interpretive canon requiring that every constitutional provision
have some effect not attributable to some other provision. 2t 2
Doff cites McCulloch v. Maryland13 for the proposition that "be-
cause [the constitution] is phrased in general language and so very
difficult to amend, its interpretation calls for some degree of flexibil-
ity. 214 He infers that "[i]t should hardly surprise us that over the course
of more than two centuries, some provisions of the Constitution faded in
importance or were rendered redundant by the sensible expansive inter-
pretation of others."25 Examples of provisions that have been rendered
superfluous by either the passage of time or changing circumstance are
the congressional power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal"
'21 6
which was left useless by the 1856 Declaration of Paris,217 and the Sev-
enth Amendment's restriction of the right to a jury in civil disputes
208. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
209. Id. at 329.
210. 307 U.S. 174 (1939); see supra notes 147-148, and accompanying text.
211. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
212. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 291, 339 (2000).
213. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
214. Dorf, supra note 212, at 341.
215. Id.
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
217. See Doff, supra note 212, at 340 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (5th ed.
1979)).
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exceeding twenty dollars, 2 8 which inflation has made irrelevant. 2' 9 Ex-
amples of redundancies caused by expansive readings of other clauses,
Dorf suggests, are the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
which was effectively rendered moot by the Establishment Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause after the Court held that only discriminatory
burdens on religion are prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause, 220 and
various Article I powers, whose needs have been obviated by the Com-
merce Clause.' Even after United States v. Lopez,22 Dorf claims,223 the
Commerce Clause power to regulate intra-state activity substantially af-
fecting interstate commerce has effectively superceded the Article I
powers to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies";
24
"to Coin Money"; 225 to provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting";
226
and, last but not least, to issue copyrights and patents. 7
Of these examples, only one concerns the permissibility of congres-
sional action under a clause that allegedly renders moot a different
constitutional provision; namely, Dorf's claim that the Commerce Clause
has obviated the need to legislate under the Bankruptcy, Coinage, Coun-
terfeiting, and Copyright Clauses. And Lopez and Railway Labor
Executives suggest that even this is still an open question. Even though
Justice Thomas was alone in warning of the potential reach of an unfet-
tered commerce power, the silence of the other members of the Lopez
majority does not show conclusively that they disagreed with Thomas's
concerns. The majority may simply have been skeptical that such a sce-
nario could ever play out. And Railway Labor Executives casts doubt on
Dorf's claim with respect to the Bankruptcy Clause. 8
In fact, there is some recent evidence that the Court does consider it
impermissible for Congress to use one constitutional power in a way that
would nullify all practical effects of another. In Perpich v. Department of
218. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
219. As Dorf notes, of course, one could argue that the need to preserve the continued
relevance of this requirement in fact requires that the monetary amount mentioned should be
indexed to inflation. See Doff, supra note 212, at 340.
220. Id.; see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
221. Doff, supra note 212, at 339-40.
222. 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act because
carrying a gun near a school cannot be considered economic activity, but reaffirming the gen-
eral principle that Congress may regulate economic activity affecting interstate commerce).
223. Doff, supra note 212, at 339-40.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
228. See supra notes 103-104, and accompanying text.
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Defense,229 the Court confronted a challenge to the "Montgomery
Amendment," which prevented states from withholding assent to con-
gressional decisions that the National Guard serve and train abroad. The
Governor of Minnesota challenged the constitutionality of the amend-
ment on the grounds that it violated, by rendering superfluous, the
constitutional grant of power to the states to train the militia.20 The
Court ultimately found that the state and federal powers at issue were
compatible, because members of state militias lose that status while
serving in the Federal National Guard.23' The federal government does
not actually train anyone that a state has a concurrent right to train, be-
cause guard members wear their state "hat" and army "hat" at different
times.232 In other words, the Constitution grants the states authority to
train members of the National Guard in their role as state militiamen,
and grants Congress power to train the same personnel insofar as is a
necessary adjunct of their role in the National Guard. This dual system,
the Court found, does not nullify the Clause 16 grant of power to the
states.233 Rather, it simply recognizes federal supremacy in military af-
fairs. 234 It is telling that the Court went to great lengths to refute the
Governor's claim that Congress had effectively nullified a grant of power
to the states. If such nullification were permissible, the Court would
never have had to reach the factual question of whether it had occurred.
The anti-superfluousness argument appears inconclusive, insofar as
the Commerce Clause and the Copyright Clause are concerned. In some
cases the Court has apparently put a limit on inter-clause encroachment.
In other cases it has done no such thing. As a result, the anti-
superfluousness argument cannot establish whether there is a conflict
between those clauses unless we have some independent grounds upon
which to say that the Copyright Clause is or is not one of those provi-
sions that may not be made obsolete. And, if we knew that, we would
already have the answer that the anti-superfluousness argument is de-
signed to give us.
C. Logical Consistency
Both of the preceding arguments fall into the trap of examining
whether the two clauses conflict only after first considering constitu-
tional provisions independently of the others in order to determine the
229. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1.16; see Perpich, 496 U.S. at 337.
231. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347.
232. Id. at 348.
233. Id. at 351.
234. Id.
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proper scope of each. But that analysis will always be circular, and there-
fore unhelpful, because until we know whether the clauses may
permissibly overlap, and in what ways, we have no means of determin-
ing their proper scope. The clauses themselves, in other words, cannot be
the arbiters of whether they conflict with each other.
To solve this problem, we might learn from Laurence Tribe, who
writes that "[lread in isolation, most of the Constitution's provisions
make only a highly limited kind of sense. Only as an interconnected
whole do these provisions meaningfully constitute a frame of govern-
ment ' 235 Considering the Constitution as a whole, then, we could fix a
benchmark against which to determine whether two clauses conflict with
each other by examining whether the allegedly conflicting scope of each
clause is compatible with the internal dynamics of the Constitution.
A difficulty arises in specifying what is meant by the "internal
dynamics" of the Constitution. One suggestion, which is both intuitively
pleasing and, perhaps for that reason, quite popular, is that the
Constitution all fits together to form a coherent, logically consistent
whole, whose fundamental internal order may not be disturbed. Justice
Marshall, for example, was not deterred from concluding that Maryland
could not tax a national federal bank simply because no constitutional
provision in particular suggests that conclusion. 36 He echoed the
sentiment that "as a matter of general structural logic, surely the part
cannot control the whole. 237 In the practical world, of course, there is no
reason why a part cannot control the whole in at least some respects. So
what Justice Marshall must surely have recognized is that the logic of
the federal system as described by the Constitution is such that in some
respects the whole must be supreme. This is one of those respects.
As pleasing as this idea is, it is not clear that it helps sort out poten-
tial conflicts between clauses. First, it may be impossible to reach any
kind of neutral consensus on just what counts as internal consistency
simply by specifying that "internal consistency" means "logical consis-
tency." After all, what Justice Marshall means cannot be "logical" in the
abstract, quasi-mathematical sense. Almost any reading of the Constitu-
tion is internally consistent in that sense. What he must mean is "logical"
in the sense of practical reasoning: compatibility in the eyes of a reason-
able person. Not only do reasonable people differ on whether certain
ideas are consistent with each other, even when they are broadly in
235. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1995).
236. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
237. See Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 752 (1999); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 426-33 (1819).
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agreement about what consistency means, they also differ on what con-
sistency involves in the first place. For some, it will be a matter of simple
descriptive accommodation-whether it is possible for two ideas to be
true at the same time; for others consistency may be a more normative
concept-whether the values underlying idea A permit one to also hold
idea B.238
Second, even if we do have a sense of what consistency means, it is
not clear that inter-clause encroachment is actually a source of inconsis-
tency. There is no logical reason why the Constitution cannot overlap in
parts. And there is no reason why the Constitution, as a "living docu-
ment, 239 cannot breathe a little as times change and one clause expands
in influence and scope while others contract. There does not even seem
any logical reason why one clause cannot encroach upon another to
point of rendering it superfluous. True, one might say that it would be
inconsistent for Congress to act under the Commerce Clause if doing so
encroached on the Copyright Clause in a way that was somehow incon-
sistent with Congress's own goals in performing that same action, but
that is more a practical inconsistency than a logical one, and it is easy to
imagine circumstances in which any self-defeating aspect of the legisla-
tion was more than compensated for by its advantages.
One possible source of purely internal inconsistency in congres-
sional action that uses one clause to evade the limitations imposed by
another is the principle that the fundamental character of the Constitu-
tion entails certain relationships between its parts that would be violated
by that kind of evasion. William Patry argues that "[t]he Constitution is
not a series of hermetically sealed provisions such that Congress may
ignore the restrictions on its power contained in one clause merely by
legislating under another clause."240
There is some evidence that the Supreme Court does not believe that
the Constitution should read as a series of discrete provisions, each
conferring powers on various governmental branches independently of
the others. For instance, the Court holds a long-standing concern for the
"spirit of the constitution ' 24' as well as its letter, suggesting some degree
238. Christopher Eisgruber, for example, labels the idea that the Constitution is "a har-
monious and pleasing composition" the "aesthetic fallacy," and his reasons for so judging are
almost entirely based on what he considers "clumsy, regrettable" aspects of the Constitution
(into which category he places both the inclusion of a bill of rights, and the absence in that bill
of rights of an equality right) which conflict with the values he considers the Constitution as a
whole to endorse. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and
Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1617-19 (1997).
239. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952) (Vinson, J.,
dissenting).
240. Patry, supra note 16 at 371.
241. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
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of interrelation between the various clauses and provisions. Perhaps the
clearest example of this concern is the Court's interpretation of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which states, "[t]he Congress shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration. ' '21 Although, on its face, this might
appear to replace prior authority for taxation with a new power that
enables Congress to levy taxes without regard for the general welfare,
which is not mentioned at all in its text, this is not the case. Instead, the
Amendment is interpreted as merely removing one of the Clause 1
limitations on the congressional power to tax. As the Supreme Court
noted in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
243
It is clear on the face of [the Sixteenth Amendment's] text that it
does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in generic
sense-an authority already possessed and never questioned-or
to limit and distinguish between one kind of income taxes and
another, but that the whole purpose of the Amendment was to re-
lieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a
consideration of the source whence the income was derived.2"
This is actually not at all clear on the face of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment's text. If that same text had been used to describe the taxation
power in the original Constitution, it is unlikely that the Court would
have described it in this way. Clearly, the Court is looking beyond the
text of one particular provision to examine how it relates to other
clauses, and perhaps even the overall Preamble. It may have been
prompted to do this, and informed by the judicial and congressional his-
tory leading up to passage of the amendment, but it did so nonetheless.
Even two apparent counter examples to the "interdependence thesis,"
the independence of Clause 1 spending power from other Section 8 pro-
visions, and the independence of the Treaty Power from all other
242. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
243. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
244. Id. at 17-18; see also United States v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1988)
("Therefore, the Sixteenth Amendment, along with the pre-existing taxing power created by
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, provides Congress with the necessary authority to
impose a direct, non-apportioned income tax.") (citation omitted). Thus, prior to ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment we find the Court remarking that "[t]he Constitution contains only
two limitations on the right of Congress to levy excise taxes; they must be levied for the public
welfare and are required to be uniform throughout the United States:' Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 153 (1911), and after ratification we find that "the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of the 'general welfare,'" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
(1987).
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provisions, do not turn out to be counter-examples upon closer inspec-
tion.
i. The Clause 1 spending power The battle over Clause 1 between
Hamilton, who believed it conferred a distinct power to tax and spend
independently of the other powers, and Madison, who held that it was
simply a formal authorization of the power to fund activities under the
other Section 8 clauses, was won by Hamilton (with help from Justice
Story). 2' To the extent the Clause 1 taxation power is not limited to the
specific purposes or powers of the other Section 8 clauses, it follows that
none of the other Section 8 clauses are limited by each other, and even
that constitutional provisions in general must be understood independ-
ently of one another.
On closer examination, however, this interpretation is not warranted.
United States v Butler46 illustrates that the triumph of the Hamiltonian
position, as represented by Justice Story, was a victory for a particular
interpretation of the phrase "general welfare. '2 7 To be sure, Madison and
Hamilton may each have been led to their respective interpretations of
this phrase by their political convictions and divergent visions of the new
republic, but the battle turned on the tenability of their interpretations
qua interpretations, not qua political philosophies. As the Butler Court
explained, the fatal problem with the Madisonian view was that because
one would reasonably read into the other Section 8 clauses the implicit
authority to raise funds to finance them, reading Clause 1 as nothing
more than a reference to the other clauses would render it tautological.4
A canon of construction that warns against interpreting a clause as
entirely pointless even at the time of insertion into the Constitution is not
at all the same as a canon to the effect that constitutional provisions must
always be understood entirely in isolation from one another even when
times change, along with the contexts in which those provisions are
applied. Indeed, by interpreting one clause in light of the others, it
suggests exactly the opposite.
245. See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936);
see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ch.
XIV passim (5th Ed 1891).
246. 297 U.S. 1.
247. Id. at 65.
248. Id. A similar concern for the structural integrity of the constitution should the
spending clause be interpreted on Hamiltonian lines is reflected in Thomas Jefferson's caution
that the clause "ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited powers .... so
taken as to destroy the whole residue of that instrument" Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the Ken-
tucky Resolutions, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 449, 452 (Merrill Peterson ed.,
1984).
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ii. Treaty powers. In Missouri v. Holland,4 9 a case concerning the
constitutionality of congressional regulation of migratory birds pursuant
to a treaty between the United States and Great Britain,50 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that because such regulation was not authorized by
any of the powers granted Congress by Article I, Section 8, the Tenth
Amendment would ordinarily reserve those powers to the states.25' How-
ever, the Court found that the Treaty Power provided an independent
authority for implementing congressional legislation.252 The Court held
that such authority could not be constrained "by some general invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment, 253 but only by
"prohibitory words" actually found in the Constitution.2 54
Despite its insistence on prohibitory words, though, this case does
not have any significant implications for the scope of the Copyright
Clause preamble. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states only those
powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. And
to the extent that the Treaty Power is granted to the government by the
Constitution, an otherwise permissible treaty will automatically remove
any Tenth Amendment objections to measures contained therein. Before
the treaty in question was signed, Congress had no authority to regulate
migratory birds, so any attempt to do so would have violated the Tenth
Amendment, but after the treaty was signed, regulation of migratory
birds became a de facto congressional power for Tenth Amendment pur-
poses. In essence, then, the Holland Court was simply rejecting an ill-
considered argument, rather than making a significant statement of its
own about the Constitution's internal dynamics.
The interesting question raised by Holland with regard to the
Copyright Clause is whether its preamble contains "prohibitory words."
But that, of course, is the question at issue in this Article. Holland
simply stands for the proposition that if it turns out that the "promote
progress" requirement does constrain Congress then the Treaty Power
may be constrained along with other forms of congressional action. It
cannot, therefore, help us answer that underlying question.
249. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
250. Id. at 431.
251. Id. at 432; see U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.").
252. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (noting that this authority is granted by Article
II, Section 2, delegating the power to make treaties, in combination with Article VI, which
declares treaties to be the supreme law of the land).
253. Id. at 433-34.
254. Id. at 433.
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This too seems to be the problem with the consistency approach to
inter-clause conflicts. The consistency approach cannot explain if, and
when, two clauses overlap each other in a way that requires them to be
mutually consistent. We can only tell whether two clauses are consistent
with each other once we have already determined their proper scope, and
thereby the extent to which they overlap, but that is precisely what con-
sistency analysis is supposed to tell us. Unless we have some factor
outside the clauses themselves that can tell us whether they are consis-
tent with each other, there does not appear to be any non-circular way to
decide whether they are consistent. So, for example, only if we knew
(1) whether limitations imposed by the preamble of the copyright clause
extend to activity undertaken in the name of the Commerce Clause, we
would know (2) whether congressional action under the latter that
evaded those limitations would be inconsistent with the Copyright
Clause, in which case we would know (1) whether limitations imposed
by the preamble of the copyright clause extend to activity undertaken in
the name of the Commerce Clause, and so on.
D. Purpose
The above three arguments amply demonstrate the difficulties in-
volved in trying to describe a plausible basis for finding that legislation
under the Commerce Power conflicts with the Copyright Clause; and to
concurrently determine that it is the commerce power that must therefore
be restrained. Although both the evasion and encroachment arguments
succeed in establishing that Congress may neither constitutionally legis-
late under an inappropriate provision in order to evade constraints laid
down by a different provision, nor (in some cases) expand the scope of
one clause to the extent that another clause becomes superfluous. Neither
succeeds in establishing an independent benchmark by which to define
the proper scope of each clause. Depending on how one views the Copy-
right and Commerce Clauses, one may equally plausibly say either that
congressional intellectual property legislation passed under the Com-
merce Clause but forbidden by the Copyright Clause is appropriate or
that it is not. The logical consistency argument is more promising, but
ultimately still circular. It succeeds in framing an independent bench-
mark for evaluating whether congressional action causes an
unconstitutional conflict between two clauses. Yet, that framework pro-
vides no help in resolving actual disputes because it cannot explain what
must be consistent with what. By comparing the clauses to each other,
their consistency becomes dependent on the very determination of per-
missible scope that the consistency analysis was supposed to give us in
the first place.
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These problems can be overcome, I suggest, if we think of conflicts
that may or may not be unconstitutional as occurring not between the
clauses themselves, but between the constitutional purposes that we be-
lieve each clause serves. If, for example, both clauses serve the same
purpose, such as the general welfare, then it would not seem to matter
which clause Congress legislates under. On the other hand, if we think at
a less general level that each clause serves a specific constitutional pur-
pose distinct from that served by the other, then to the extent that those
purposes come into conflict, so will the clauses themselves. We must try
to resolve that conflict by considering which, if either, purpose is best
able to accommodate some concession to the other. In essence, this pur-
posive analysis fills in the gaps of internal consistency analysis, by
explaining what it is that must be consistent with what, without begging
the question whether the limitations of one clause apply to action under
another.
Because purpose is so important to understanding inter-clause con-
flicts, it is therefore a good candidate to serve as the "what" in terms of
which clauses are or are not consistent. This is so because such conflicts
are unlikely to occur except between clauses involving at least one pur-
posive limitation between them. If a particular provision contains a
limitation that is not purposive at all, but simply a technical limitation
specific to that clause, then there not only seems no reason why action
under a different clause should be constrained in its name, but there also
seems no reason why such a constraint would even become an issue. The
uniformity requirement of bankruptcy laws, for example, could have no
implications for other aspects of federal financial regulation unless one
were able to suggest a way in which the uniformity requirement served a
constitutional purpose that transcends bankruptcy laws. And if a provi-
sion no longer has any meaningful purpose, such as the power to grant
letters of marque and reprisal, it is unlikely that it would ever come into
conflict with another power actually being asserted. In other words, if
there is a conflict between two clauses, it will be because they are both
considered to have a viable and important constitutional function.
This is not to say that one must attempt to discover the one correct
purpose behind a provision or try to discern the intentions of the framers
in including it in the Constitution. The point here is simply that because
one cannot resolve conflicts between clauses without reference to
purpose, the true conflict in any given case is likely to be fought between
those purposes, and so any attempt to resolve it requires that we frame
the disagreement in those terms. It does not actually matter how one
decides what the purpose of a provision is, only that one can explain
one's reasoning.
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Purposive analysis solves, at least to some degree, a problem raised
in connection with consistency analysis-what qualifies as consistency.
Asking whether two purposes are consistent with each other bridges the
gap between descriptive and normative accounts of consistency, because
a purpose is a simultaneously descriptive and normative idea. Saying
"the purpose of X is Y"' is descriptive because it describes what one uses
X for, but it is also value-laden because one could not want to do Y if one
did not consider it a good idea. Asking whether one may logically try to
advance two purposes at the same time is essentially the same thing as
asking whether one may realize both purposes without compromising
the values of either.
Disagreement will still exist about the purpose of each clause, the
extent to which different purposes are compatible, and, in cases of con-
flict, which is more important. But there is no reason to believe that this
disagreement will be any more extensive than that accompanying any
exercise in constitutional analysis. Much of the contemporary debate
about the Second Amendment, for example, concerns the meaning of
what I have referred to as its purposive preamble: "A well-regulated mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free State., 255 Although there
exists significant, possibly intractable disagreement about what a "well-
regulated militia" is in the current context,256 each side in the debate de-
scribes Second Amendment constraints on governmental action in terms
of the purpose of that amendment,21 and the debate does go on. Cer-
tainly, intractability is not a unique aspect of the debate about the Second
Amendment. 25"
255. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
256. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrec-
tionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 650 (1995) ("The
controversy is largely over whether the Framers meant the right to bear arms to apply exclu-
sively to organized state militias tasked with resisting possible federal tyranny (the collectivist
theory) or whether they wanted it to apply to the people in an individual sense (the individual
rights theory).").
257. Compare, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed.
1988) ("the central concern of the framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the
state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing national army and the consequent
destruction of local autonomy."), with Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amend-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 646-47, 651 (1989) ("There is strong evidence that 'militia' refers to
all of the people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the community .... we see
that one aspect of the structure of checks and balances within the purview of 18th century
thought was the armed citizen.").
258. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Putting Faith Back into Constitutional Scholarship: A
Defense of Originalism, 36 CATHOLIC LAW. 137, 137 (1995) ("In one of the most enduring
and seemingly intractable debates in modern constitutional scholarship, interpretivists and
noninterpretivists argue over the proper task of the judiciary in its exercise of judicial re-
view."); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
893, 893 (1994) ("The academic debate over affirmative action has become a bitter stale-
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In the context of the Preamble to the Constitution, the underlying
purpose of the Constitution as a whole-as revealed in that Preamble-
has been invoked to adjudicate apparent conflicts between constitutional
clauses. In the absence of any internal purposive guidance within the
clauses themselves, the Court apparently turns to the overall purpose of
the Constitution as a canon of construction. In Lichter v. United States, 259
the Court defended a congressional exercise of war powers against a
non-delegation doctrine challenge,26 on the grounds that "while the con-
stitutional structure and controls of our Government are our guides
equally in war and in peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes
of the entire instrument fully in mind,' 26' specifically, the Preamble's ref-
erence to providing for the common defense and securing the blessings
of liberty for posterity.2 62 In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp.,263 the Court similarly invoked the purpose of the Constitution to
resolve a conflict between the Federal Employers' Liability Act, passed
by Congress under the commerce power,264 and the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which was alleged to prevent the application of FELA to a state
port authority on state sovereignty grounds.26 The Court declared that
the sovereign immunity of states was not an intrinsic part of the Eleventh
Amendment, but rather a judicial interpretation of how that Amendment
should be applied, and held that the commerce power in this instance
took precedence because, "when confronted with the question whether a
judge-made doctrine of this character should be extended or contained, it
is entirely appropriate for a court to give controlling weight to the Foun-
ders' purpose to 'establish Justice.!,,66
As I will argue in the next Section, there is reason to believe that not
only is purposive analysis also possible with regard to conflicts between
mate."); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 585 n.124
("The intractable nature of the abortion debate").
259. 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
260. Although the non-delegation doctrine is not laid down explicitly in any single
clause of the Constitution, it is essentially shorthand for the combined import of Article I,
Section 1 ("All legislative Powers herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."), Article I, Section 8, Clause
18 ("[The Congress shall have the Power to] make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers"), and the Tenth Amendment ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). See Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935).
261. Lichter, 334 U.S. at 782.
262. Id. at 782 n.34.
263. 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
264. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 116 (2001).
265. Hess, 513 U.S. at 33-35.
266. Id. at 54-55.
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the Copyright and Commerce Clauses, it may be particularly well-suited
to that subject matter because of the purposive interrelationship between
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. The interaction between
intellectual property rights and free expression suggests that the pur-
poses embodied in the preamble to the Copyright Clause transcend the
bounds of that clause and have important consequences for our under-
standing of the scope of other constitutional provisions. One's
conclusions about a purposive conflict between the Copyright Clause
and the Commerce Clause, for example, may entail corresponding con-
clusions about First Amendment jurisprudence, and vice versa. To the
extent that it has already been established that the First Amendment
takes precedence over the Commerce Clause,"' then, if a purposive ap-
peal to the Copyright Clause preamble implicates the constitutional
guarantee of free expression, the Commerce Clause may have to yield.
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE COPYRIGHT
CLAUSE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
For the sake of argument, assume that the purpose of the Commerce
Clause is to facilitate free trade by empowering the federal government
to prevent protectionist behavior by the states, and otherwise grease the
wheels of commerce in order to benefit both the nation as a whole 268 and
the individuals engaged in trade. 69 Let us also say that this purpose is a
valid and important one. The questions before us are (1) whether the
purpose of the Copyright Clause is compatible with that purpose, and
(2) if not, which must take precedence in case of conflict.
The most plausible reading of the Copyright Clause, I argued in Sec-
tion I, is that its preamble constrains Congress by specifying the purpose
for which intellectual property rights may be issued; namely, to provide
an incentive to authors. And, I suggested, there are two closely con-
nected ways in which one might understand why this purpose is
267. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447,449 (1991) ("the Commerce Clause
does more than confer power on the Federal Government; it is also a substantive 'restriction
on permissible state regulation' of interstate commerce.... the Clause was intended to benefit
those who, like petitioner, are engaged in interstate commerce. The 'constitutional protection
against burdens on commerce is for [their] benefit.'" (quoting Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373, 376-377 (1946)).
269. See, e.g., Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) ("The
few simple words of the Commerce Clause ... reflected a central concern of the Framers that
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in
order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Bal-
kanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation.") (internal quotations ommitted).
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important: negatively, as a means to prevent monopolies of information,
and positively, as a means of actively facilitating the dissemination of
ideas. I think it is fair to say that this purpose, however described, is
valid and important. If there is a conflict between the Commerce Clause
and the Copyright Clause it will not be easy to sort out which purpose is
more valuable.
It is not clear that there is any necessary conflict between the two.
The Commerce Clause is, after passage of the Sherman Act at least,20
broadly opposed to monopolistic behavior of precisely the type the
Copyright preamble is designed to prevent. If Congress can satisfy the
courts that intellectual property legislation is compatible with its mission
to enable free trade, one could argue that the purposes of the Copyright
Clause are being well served thereby. The same intellectual property
rights that serve the free trade of ideas could also facilitate the free ex-
pression of ideas. Just as authors are more likely to devote their time and
energy to creative pursuits if a commercial market is available for their
output, so too will publishers and distributors be more willing to invest
in risky authors and new markets if they are assured that they will have
the opportunity to profit by doing so.
It is clear, though, that there is potential for conflict in individual
cases. As William Patry noted, Commerce Clause legislation assigning
intellectual property rights "decreases the amount and type of informa-
tion freely available as surely as when Congress legislates under the
Copyright Clause."2 7  Therefore, he argues, if Congress wanted to enact
unlimited copyright protection, and turned to the commerce power to
avoid the Copyright Clause's limitation of its power to limited term
copyrights, that would have exactly the same effect as that which moti-
vated the inclusion of the "limited times" provision into the Copyright
Clause: a perpetual monopoly.272 Patry's concerns in this respect do not
seem entirely unwarranted. Congress could make a good case that
(1) intellectual property regulation must occur at the national, not state
level, especially in light of the role that the internet plays in modem
copyright disputes, and (2) that the distribution of intellectual property
rights will have a substantial impact on interstate and foreign commerce.
There is no reason to think that unlimited copyrights would be any
harder to link to interstate commerce than limited term copyrights.
It seems likely, then, that any conflicts between the Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause will occur on a case-by-case basis,
where congressional legislation violates the purposive limitations of the
270. See 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (2003).
271. Patry, supra note 16, at 371.
272. See id. at 376.
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Copyright Clause but is not forbidden by the purposes of the Commerce
Clause. This leaves the courts to sort out the extent to which enabling
free trade or promoting progress takes precedence over the other in any
given case. Fortunately, the purposive interrelationship between the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment suggests two reasons why
the answer to this inquiry may be more straightforward than it may seem
at first glance, and that in the majority of cases the preamble of the
Copyright Clause would prevail.
First, the Commerce Clause must adhere to the requirements of the
First Amendment.273 Although Congress is, as noted above,274 given con-
siderable discretion with respect to almost all of the limiting language in
the Constitution, judicial deference is markedly less extensive in First
Amendment cases. As such, we can say with some confidence that even
in the name of the commerce power Congress may not constitutionally
enact intellectual property legislation that fails to comply with the rigid
First Amendment limitations the Supreme Court has placed on similar
legislation under the Copyright Clause. The Court has made it clear that
copyrights walk a fine line between restricting and promoting speech
and must strictly adhere to the idea/expression distinction and fair use
doctrine in order to be compatible with the First Amendment.275 Conse-
quently, any action under the Commerce Clause that might water down
these principles would be subject to exacting scrutiny. Indeed, in such
cases judicial scrutiny would be "fatal in fact" because the Court does
not suggest merely that some blurring or erosion of the idea/expression
distinction and fair use doctrine might, on balance, violate the First
Amendment, but that only by virtue of adhering to these principles are
intellectual property rights permissible in the first place. Furthermore,
although Congress may well enact intellectual property legislation on a
content neutral basis,276 the power to limit expression thereby delegated
to private individuals may then be wielded on whatever basis the rights
holder desires.
Second, if it is true, as Tushnet argues, that the constitutionality of
intellectual property rights "depends on the fact that the government in-
273. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
274. See supra sections II.A & II.B, and accompanying text.
275. See Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,556 (1985)
("Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as copyright protects only form of
expression and not the ideas expressed") (citation omitted); see also Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 788-89
(noting that the Copyright Clause has two "built-in First Amendment accommodations": the
idea/expression distinction, and the fair use requirement).
276. A content neutral law restricts speech if the law can be justified without reference to
the particular content of that speech. See Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).
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terest underlying copyright is the promotion of speech," 277 then the pre-
amble of the Copyright Clause must be adhered to in order to justify
those rights no matter what power Congress invokes when granting
them. The conflict between the First Amendment and intellectual prop-
erty rights is not specific to rights granted under the auspices of any one
clause because it arises from the practical effects of the rights issued, not
the nature of the authority invoked to do so. If the idea/expression dis-
tinction, even when combined with statutory fair use requirements, is
insufficient to make intellectual property rights compatible with the First
Amendment, and it is only the actual purpose of promoting progress that
makes copyrights constitutional, then strict scrutiny would also be ap-
propriate to ensure compliance with the Copyright Clause preamble,
whether the scrutinized legislation is passed under the authority of the
Copyright Clause or the Commerce Clause. If promoting progress is as
vital to copyright's constitutionality as are the idea/expression distinction
and fair use doctrine, then the Harper and Row analysis would require
that they be considered with the same degree of seriousness.
One may argue that Tushnet is wrong, of course, in which case the
proper standard of scrutiny for Commerce Clause intellectual property
laws would be less strict but someone making that argument would be
faced with a problem. As noted above, there seems to be only one way to
understand the preamble of the Copyright Clause in light of the rest of
the clause-namely, as a purposive preamble directed towards issuing
intellectual property rights. And there seem to be two ways of under-
standing why its purposive requirement should constrain Congress
today: one is the originalist reading of the purpose behind the actual in-
clusion of the clause in the Constitution, the other is Tushnet's First
Amendment compatibility theory. If Tushnet's theory is rejected, then
one is forced either to adopt the originalist interpretation of the pream-
ble, in which case one is probably more committed to preventing the
issuance of copyrights without ensuring that doing so will definitely
promote progress, or to reject what is arguably the only plausible expla-
nation of the preamble, in which case one's position on Copyright and
Commerce Clause conflicts will lack a necessary element.
CONCLUSION
Anthony Trollope wrote in his autobiography, "Take away from Eng-
lish authors their copyrights, and you would very soon take away from
277. Tushnet, supra note 64, at 35.
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England her authors. '278 No doubt this is also true of many American
authors, and it is in recognition of this fact that the Constitution empow-
ers Congress to grant intellectual property rights. But Trollope's claim is
increasingly made today not by authors, but by publishing houses, movie
studios, and "content providers" of all kinds, seeking to gain and retain
the right to sell their intellectual property well beyond the period neces-
sary to encourage its production. It is in anticipation of such claims that
the Constitution specifies that Congress may only grant intellectual
property rights for one purpose: to promote the development and dis-
semination of ideas. Copyrights and patents, thus understood, walk a fine
line between commerce and free expression, and the Copyright Clause
provides the instructions for keeping on the straight and narrow.
A series of recent cases suggest that not only are those instructions
receiving less attention from Congress than they ought, but that the
courts are increasingly willing to defer to congressional autonomy in this
regard. Furthermore, there are signs that even if the judiciary does insist
that intellectual property legislation passed under the auspices of the
Copyright Clause adhere to the constraints laid down in its preamble,
Congress may simply enact similar legislation under the commerce
power. This Article has attempted to show that not only must the pream-
ble of the Copyright Clause be complied with when Congress legislates
under that clause, but must also be adhered to when Congress enacts in-
tellectual property legislation under any authority. As Jefferson put it,
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and im-
provement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like the air we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.
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